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If monetary policy is to aim at ﬁnancial stability, how would it change? To ana-
lyze this question, this paper develops a general-form model with endogenous bank risk
proﬁles. Policy rates aﬀect both bank incentives to search for yield and the cost of whole-
sale funding. Financial stability objectives are then shown to make a monetary authority
more conservative and more aggressive. Conservative as it sets higher rates on average.
And aggressive because, in reaction to negative shocks, cuts are deeper but shorter-lived
than otherwise. Keeping cuts short is crucial as bank risk responds primarily to stable
low rates. Within the short span, cuts then must be deep to achieve standard objectives.
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One of the prime suspects for the cause of the recent ﬁnancial crisis is low monetary policy
rates. Various authors have argued that the US Fed’s accommodative policies spurred risk
taking incentives among the ﬁnancial intermediaries that were at the heart of the crisis.1
Three recent papers investigate empirically the link between monetary policy to bank risk
taking. Maddaloni et al. (2009) use data from the Euro Area Bank Lending Survey to show
that lower overnight rates soften lending standards. This softening is beyond what can be
explained by other factors aﬀected by the rates, like the quality of the borrower’s collateral.
Interestingly, moreover, they ﬁnd evidence that keeping rates too low for too long reduces
credit standards even further. Jiménez et al. (2009) and Iaonnidou et al. (2009) use data
from Spanish and Bolivian credit registers, respectively. In both countries monetary policy
was largely determined abroad over the sample period. Controlling for various bank, borrower
and market characteristics, these studies ﬁnd robust evidence that lower short-term rates spur
the granting of loans to worse quality borrowers.2
Various authors have called for the formulation of a monetary policy that explicitly con-
siders bank risk taking and ﬁnancial stability.3 In this paper, we take the case for ‘leaning
against the wind’ as given, and ask the following questions: if such an action is desirable,
how would it aﬀect optimal monetary policy? Would it involve a level shift in interest rates?
Would it imply a diﬀerent timing of monetary policy? We develop a general-form analyti-
cal framework to address these questions. It contains a representative bank and a monetary
authority, whose choice variables, the risk proﬁle and the path of policy rates respectively,
interact to aﬀect economic activity. The bank’s risky projects are long-term loans that are
relatively illiquid: only a fraction terminate each period. Bank default probabilities rise in its
maturity mismatch. The monetary authority puts a weight on preventing the event of default,
the social costs of which are only partially internalized by the bank. The larger this weight,
the more "ﬁnancial stability" oriented we say the authority is. It controls the risk-free rate
through which it can both inﬂuence inﬂation and economic activity, and the appetite of the
bank to search for yield.
We solve the game between the bank and the authority analytically. The model’s main
1These include Borio and Zhu (2008), Dell’Ariccia et al. (2008), Calomiris (2009), Brunnermaier (2009),
Brunnermaier et al. (2009), Taylor (2009), Allen et al. (2009), Adrian and Shin (2009), and Diamond and
Rajan (2009).
2In the case of the recent crisis, worsening lending standards materialized primarily on the housing market.
See Dell’Arricia et al. (2008), Mian and Suﬁ (2008), Keys et al. (forthcoming), Demyanyk and Van Hemert
(forthcoming) and Taylor (2009).
3Borio and White (2004), Borio and Zhu (2008) and Adrian and Shin (2008, 2009a). A related view is
that monetary policy should focus on credit growth (Christiano et al. (2007, 2008)) or credit spreads (Taylor
(2008), McCulley and Toloui (2008), Cúrdia and Woodford (2009)).
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Figure 1: Interest rate path following a negative shock
results are summarized by the ﬁgure above, which represents the response of the monetary
authority to a negative economic shock. The dotted line graphs the policy of an authority that
‘leans against the wind’, while the solid line is that of an authority with standard-objectives.
There are two main eﬀects to the ﬁnancial stability objective: a level eﬀect and a dynamic
eﬀect shown in ﬁgure 1. The level eﬀect means that an authority that ‘leans against the
wind’ has a higher steady state interest rate. That is, on average it sets higher rates and is
willing to put a degree of deﬂationary pressure on the economy to prevent the buildup of risks.
The dynamic eﬀect is what we term a v-shape. The ﬁnancial stability objective makes the
authority choose a short, deep rate cut in response to a negative shock. By making the cut
short, it prevents the buildup of bank risk. The reason is that as risk is persistent, the bank
cannot rebalance its portfolio towards less risk quickly. It only chooses to raise risk when it
foresees that rates will remain low for long, while the economy starts picking up. This is closely
related to the ﬁnding of Maddaloni et al. (2009) that keeping policy rates too low for too long
is particularly damaging. But given that the ﬁnancial stability objective favors a short period
of low rates, it implies a deep cut, in order to approach its output and inﬂation objectives
as well. Therefore, within the short window it has, it cuts rates deeply to boost economic
activity over time. Overall, a policy concerned with ﬁnancial stability is both conservative
(high rates) as well as aggressive (deef but brief cuts).
Subsequently, we introduce a bank funding channel. As much discussed in the aftermath
of the crisis, low policy rates strongly aﬀect the cost of bank funding (refs). The reason is
that banks have opted for more and more short-term funding on the wholesale market over
time. By aﬀecting the cost of bank funding, the monetary authority can directly aﬀect bank
leverage. This, in turn, feeds into default probabilities. We analyze the eﬀects of the bank
funding channel on optimal monetary policy. We ﬁnd that the level eﬀect of ‘leaning against
the wind’ is strengthened.
2Finally, we provide a numerical example. We deﬁne speciﬁc functional forms and simulate
the model in order to further visualize the interactions. The simulations analyze how variables
such as the illiquidity of assets, the lagged eﬀects of monetary policy and the patience of the
policy maker aﬀect the dynamics of ‘leaning against the wind’.
Our work is related to the literature on the role of ﬁnancial intermediation in the trans-
mission of monetary policy.4 In this literature banks are mostly passive players, however,
generating a credit friction. The analyses focus on how this friction aﬀects monetary trans-
mission. An exception is a recent contribution by De Walque et al. (2008) who develop a
DSGE model with endogenous default probabilities for banks. They show that liquidity injec-
tions, which improve ﬁnancial stability, have ambiguous eﬀects on output ﬂuctuations. Their
aim and setup are quite diﬀerent from ours as in our paper we consider how bank incentives
aﬀect monetary policy through bank optimization. That is, how monetary policy aﬀects the
optimal buildup of bank risk. Our work also relates to the literature on monetary policy and
bank regulation. This literature focusses primarily on the pros and cons of conducting these
functions at the same institution.5 Instead, Cecchetti and Li (2008) ask what monetary policy
should look like given the procyclicality of bank capital requirements. They conclude that
rate cuts should be deeper during downturns in which banks are capital constrained.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 outlines the general framework, and derives the analytical
results. Section 3 then discusses the numerical example. Finally, section 4 concludes.
2 Model
We examine how interest rates are aﬀected - in levels and dynamically - when the monetary
authority has explicit ﬁnancial stability objectives, next to its standard concerns. The latter
will be captured in our model by the output stabilization term (in output gap terms) and the
former by a measure of excessive risk. We make three assumptions in our setup:
Assumption 1 The bank takes more risk than is socially optimal.
Assumption 2 Risk taking is procyclical.
Assumption 3 Risk is persistent.
The ﬁrst two assumptions will yield our level result. When the authority aims at reducing
excessive risk then it will, on average, have higher interest rates because that reduces the
bank’s risk motive. The third assumption underlies our dynamic result. When the authority
4See Bernanke and Gertler (1989, 1995), Bernanke et al. (1996), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Kashyap and
Stein (2000), Diamond and Rajan (2006) and Goodfriend and McCallum (2007).
5See Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1995), Peek et al. (1999), and Iaonnidou (2005).
3aims at reducing excessive risk then it will choose to conﬁne rate cuts to the period that banks
build down risk, and hike rates before the built-up of new risk begins.


















0 are the current and all past interest rates. The














< 0 ∀s ≤ t. (2)
Variable εt represents a persistent demand shock:
εt = θεt−1 + νt, (3)
with θ ∈ (0,1) the persistence parameter, and νt an iid shock. The impact on the business




Finally, αt is the risk proﬁle of the bank. The bank chooses a risk proﬁle for its assets
αt ∈ [0,1], where a higher αt corresponds to a more risky proﬁle. A riskier proﬁle implies
higher expected return, but also a higher volatility, and hence greater ﬁnancial instability.
Claim 1 There is a socially optimal level of bank risk taking, αw
t , such that:
∂yt ( )
∂αt





< 0 ∀αt ∈ (α
w
t ,1]. (6)
That is: up to a certain point the social beneﬁts of risk taking dominate the cost of greater
ﬁnancial instability. But beyond that point the opposite is true.
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4where ρ ∈ [0,1] is the ‘leaning against the wind’ term. For a greater ρ the monetary authority
places greater weight on preventing excessive risk taking and, thereby, the builtup of greater
ﬁnancial imbalances.
We futher assume one bank, whose management is risk neutral. This bank can be seen as
representing the banking sector’s aggregate balance sheet. The bank chooses a risk proﬁle αt
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(8)
s.t.: αt ≥ βαt−1.
A riskier proﬁle raises expected revenues, but it also raises ﬁnancial instability. The bank
dislikes instability, but less so than society. It incurrs smaller costs from a crisis or default
than society, implying that there are externalities that it fails to internalize. The bank derives
an optimal risk proﬁle αb
t > αw
t , or in other words it takes more risk than is socially optimal,
(assumption 1).




However, the business cycle aﬀects asset returns diﬀerentially. Riskier assets are more sensitive
to the state of the economy. In good times the yield curve is more upward sloping: the return
diﬀerential between relatively safe short term assets and longer term investments is large.
Therefore, both socially and bank optimal risk taking is higher in good times. This matches




> 0 for i = b,w. (10)
Finally, the constraint in (8), αt ≥ βαt−1 with β ∈ (0,1), implies that the bank’s risk
proﬁle is persistent (assumption 3). Given that risky projects involve long maturities, they
cannot all be instantaneously shed from the bank’s balance sheet. This illiquidity is a key
facet of banking theory.6
6In fact, given that riskier projects generally involve longer maturities, we could write in more general
notation: β (αt), with β
′ (αt) > 0. That is, the riskier a bank’s proﬁle, the longer the maturities of its loans,
the fewer loans terminate each period and, therefore, the more persistent its balance sheet becomes.
5A Steady state
We ﬁrst consider the implications of our set-up at the steady state, in terms of the level of
interest rates and risk taking. We abstract therefore from the dynamic eﬀects due to the
presence of stochastic shocks, εt, and the illiquid nature of the assets, αt ≥ βαt−1, and drop
the time element t. We consider the equilibria of two games: a simultaneous moves Nash game
and a Stackelberg game in which the monetary authority is the ﬁrst mover. We will show why
the latter is the more natural framework within which to analyze the issue of ‘leaning against
the wind’. We are interested in how the comparative statics change with respect to the weight
that the authority places on its ﬁnancial stability objective, ρ.




as the bank’s reaction function to the monetary authority’s interest rate. From (2)
and (10) above, it follows that the bank reduces the risk it takes following an increase in the
interest rate, i.e.:
∂αb( )
∂rf < 0. (11)
Intuitively, high interest rates cool down the economy, which makes risk taking less attractive.
The monetary authority, in turn, reacts to the level of risk that the bank takes. Deﬁne
rf (α, ) as the monetary authority’s reaction to bank’s risk taking. The eﬀect of α on its
objective function runs through y ( ). An increase in α will, as discussed above, increase y ( )
when α < αw and decrease y ( ) when α > αw. From (2), a higher rf is optimal for a higher
y ( ). Thus, we have that:
∂rf ( )
∂α




< 0 ∀ α > α
w.
The reaction functions for the two players are depicted in ﬁgure 2 below.
The solid line is the reaction function of the bank and it is unambiguously downward
sloping. The dotted line is the reaction function of the monetary authority.7 Up to αw the
optimal interest rate of the authority increases in α, and decreases thereafter. The dot at
the crossing of the two lines represents the Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous moves non-
cooperative game. It therefore maps into the optimal action for each of the two players, taking
as given the decision of the other. The corresponding interest rate and risk proﬁle are
 
rf ∗for
the authority, and ¯ αb for the bank.
7Note that the slope of the two reaction functions depends on the sensitivity of the two players to each
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Figure 2: Reaction functions
We note that the Nash equilibrium of the simultanous move non-cooperative game corre-
sponds to the same interest rate level (and level of risk taking), irrespective of the weight that














This ‘irrelevance’ of the ﬁnancial objective in the monetary authority’s losses comes about
from the fact that in such a set-up the risk taken by the banks is ‘given’. For ρ > 0 the
authority puts weight on preventing ﬁnancial instability, but it does so for a given α. By
implication the level of excessive risk in the economy as given. When excessive risk is given,
the authority cannot do much to prevent it. This, in turn, implies that the authority’s policy is
unaﬀected by the choice of ρ. However, when thinking about allowing for a ﬁnancial stability
objective in monetary policy, one would like to allow for interest rates to aﬀect the buildup
of risks in the ﬁnancial sector. In the Stackelberg set-up the monetary authority chooses its
optimal rf given the reaction function of the bank, αb  
rf, 
 
.8 It therefore chooses a point
on the bank’s reaction function, which brings it closer to its own bliss point. In doing that,
the authority considers how its interest rate decision aﬀects the bank’s risk choice, eﬀectively
endogenizing the latter’s action. This is why we consider the Stackelberg setup as the natural
one within which to consider ‘leaning against the wind’.
One ﬁnal point is that for an authority with with ρ = 0 the Nash and Stackelberg equi-
librium points are the same. The authority chooses the optimal point on the solid line. That




8See Appendix A for a discussion on the Nash versus Stackelberg game.
7rate that minimizes its objective function. For ρ = 0, however, the simultaneous-moves Nash
equilibrium must be at a point where y ( ) is zero. Since the authority has no other objec-
tive than minimizing deviations from y ( ) = 0, it will necessarily choose the rf that makes
y ( ) = 0 hold for any given α. But, then, the authority can do no better than this point in
the Stackelberg game either: its objective is still the same. Thus, for ρ = 0 the dot represents
the equilibria of both the simultaneous moves and Stackelberg games. However, for ρ > 0 the
two set-ups diverge qualitatively in important respects, as explained above.
Proposition 1 A monetary authority that ‘leans against the wind’ will, on average, impose
a higher level of interest rates. Generally,
drf
dρ > 0.
Proof. Consider the Stackelberge set-up that leads to r
f




∂rf < 0 the
authority gains on its ﬁnancial stability objective by charging a higher interest rate. However,
beyond the rate
 
rf ∗ = argminy ( )
2, that is, the optimal interest rate of the ρ = 0 authority,
a higher interest rate comes at the cost of a loss in terms of the output gap. Formally, for
rf >
 
rf ∗   
ρ=0 we have that:
∂








It follows that the more an authority leans against the wind, the more it is willing to give up






This is depicted in ﬁgure 3, below.
B Dynamic Eﬀect
We examine next the eﬀects of a one period shock on the dynamic path of the interest rate (r
f
t ,
∀t) and bank risk taking (αt, ∀t). At time t = 1 a random shock ν1 occurs, which determines
the path of εt through the persistence parameter θ. We assume that the central bank commits
to the pre-announced interest-rate path that results from its optimization.9 The steady state
analysis shown in the previous section explains how the instrument rf and risk α are related
for various values of ρ. It established a level eﬀect in rates, such that an authority that ‘leans
against the wind’ has a higher steady state interest rate. We now ask whether its policy also
dynamically diﬀers from that of an authority without a ﬁnancial stability objective. Since we
9In Appendix B we explain why (and how) this is a time-consistent policy.
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Figure 3: The Bank and diﬀerent levels of ρ
consider a one period shock only, the dynamic aspect of our exercise relates to how an authority
chooses to ‘spread’ a given policy across time When a negative shock hits, for instance, will it
choose a short, deep cut or a longer, smoother response?
Deﬁnition 1: Deﬁne λ as the proﬁle of the monetary authority’s policy response, where
a higher λ means a deeper but shorter-lived policy. More speciﬁcally:
• assign λ = 0 to the optimal policy of the monetary authority with ρ = 0. This is the
baseline case of an authority that does not lean against the wind;
• deﬁne a higher λ as a policy that shifts forward part of the rate cut.
Then: Policy proﬁle i has a higher λ than policy proﬁle j if:
∃  t :
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and for some t <   t and some t >   t the respective conditions are strictly binding. Here, rf is
the steady state interest rate and policy is thus deﬁned in deviations from that steady state.
Monetary authorities with a λ > 0 proﬁle apply deeper but shorter-lived policy rate cuts,
as a result of a negative shock (ﬁgure 4).
We can now state this section’s main result:
Proposition 2 Following a negative shock (ν1 < 0), a monetary authority that leans against
the wind (ρ > 0) chooses a proﬁle λ > 0 for its interest rates. It thus opts for a deeper
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Figure 5: Risk paths for alternative policies
Proof. We outline our proof in ﬁgure 5 where we plot the level of risk taking for two alternative
interest rate policies. We also plot the level of risk that is optimal for society. Last, the dashed
(red) line represents how the constraint on risk ( αt ≥ βαt−1) prevents the reduction of risk






∂εt = (+)(+) > 0 a negative shock, ν1 < 0, implies that αb
t decreases and
then, as εt → 0, gradually returns to αb, the bank’s steady state optimal risk taking. This
is true for any policy irrespective of λ. Then, for β > 0, the constraint αt ≥ βαt−1 will be
binding from t = 0 up to a t ´ , at which point αb
t ´
   
β=0 = βαb
t ´ −1(or = β
t ´αb). Set   t = t ´ . We
observe that for t < t ´policy cuts
     r
f
t − rf
      are less deep for λ = 0, generating risk taking
that is closer to society’s optimal. For t > t ´ , policy cuts
     r
f
t − rf
      implied by λ > 0 however,
generate risk taking that is closer to society’s optimal. Then up to t ´the constrained paths of
λ = 0 and λ > 0 are equivalent. But, subsequently, λ > 0 has lower risk taking. In terms














(1 − ρ)[yt ( )]
2 
by the deﬁnition that λ = 0 is the path of the ρ = 0 authority, which
minimizes [yt ( )]
2. It follows that the more weight the authority puts on preventing ﬁnancial
imbalances (higher ρ), the more it is willing to give up on minimizing [yt ( )]
2 to achieve a
lower (αt − αw
t )
2, or in other words
dλ
dρ > 0.
Intuitively, the bank builds up risk when the economy picks up again, while rates are still
low. This is the pattern observed in the aftermath of the 2001-2003 recession, which some
have argued contributed to the current crisis. An authority that leans against the wind wants
to prevent this type of pattern but it is also willing to do so by allowing for greater output
gap volatility. By raising rates quickly after an initial cut incentives to buildup risk later are
mitigated.
In summary, the authority that leans against the wind has a higher steady state interest
rate. But, compared to that rate, it makes a larger initial rate cut, following a shock However,
it subsequently raises rates back more steeply than the authority with ρ = 0.
t 1 ˆ t
f r
0 r> > > >
0 r = = = =
Figure 6: Leaning against the wind
Note that it need not be the case that the dotted line crosses the solid line, as in this
example. The initial rate cut of the ρ > 0 authority is larger than that of the ρ = 0 authority
compared to their respective steady states. But because the ρ > 0 authority has higher steady
state levels, in absolute terms its rates may still always exceed those of the ρ = 0 authority.
Corollary 1 Proposition 1 does not extend to an upturn (ν1 > 0). No unambiguous statement
can be made about the eﬀect of a higher ρ on the dynamics of monetary policy response to a
positive shock.




smaller under a higher λ, as αb
t is the same till   t, and less afterwards. This does not extend
to a positive shock, however. A higher λ, which here implies steeper initial rate hike, does
translate into a smaller αb
0. But for t >   t: αb
t
   
λ>0 > αb
t
   
λ=0. Thus, there is a parameter-
dependent trade-oﬀ, instead of stochastic dominance, and no general proof can be derived.
The asymmetry between the negative and the positive shock emanates from the one-sided
condition αt ≥ βαt−1. Intuitively, moving the asset portfolio from shorter to longer maturities
is not very time consuming. But the converse is: building down risk takes time, as risky loans
involve long-term commitments. The argument for the v-shaped response described above
depends upon the persistence of risk.
C Bank funding
So far our analysis has only considered the eﬀects of monetary policy on the bank’s asset side.
However, policy rates have important transmission eﬀects through bank funding too. This is
especially true for wholesale ﬁnancing, which largely occurs at short maturities. Low short
term rates make bank ﬁnancing cheaper. This directly aﬀects bank proﬁts - Pt
 






< 0. More importantly, however:
Assumption 4 Cheaper funding raises bank incentives to become leveraged.
When interest rates decrease debt funding becomes cheaper relative to equity funding.
Though leverage can directly aﬀect bank risk, within the conﬁnes of our model we identify the
following channel. The less equity the bank holds, the less it internalizes the consequences of
a potential bankruptcy. That is, leveraging increases the gap between the bank’s and society’s
optimal risk taking, so that there is an additional eﬀect:
∂
 
αb − αw 
∂rf < 0.
By the last three sentences of the proof of Proposition 1, this strengthens the dynamic eﬀect.




dρ becomes larger, which strengthens
the steady-state result. This can be seen in ﬁgure 7:
where ρBF > 0 is an equivalent ρ but incorporating the bank funding channel. Overall,
therefore, the introduction of bank funding adds to both the level and dynamic eﬀects of
leaning against ﬁnancial imbalances.
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Figure 7: Leaning against the wind and bank funding
3 Numerical example
To further visualize the interaction between monetary policy and bank risk taking, this section
provides an example of the model for speciﬁc functional forms. The functional forms will also
allow us to obtain assumptions 1 and 2 endogenously from the bank optimization problem.
The persistence of risk, assumption 3, remain embodied in the paramater β, however. We
simplify the structure by assuming that there are only two classes of assets: one risky and one
risk-free asset. We now let αt stand for the fraction of its portfolio that a bank invests in the
risky asset. The return on the risky asset is termed ra
t , while r
f
t is the return on the risk-free
asset. In our simpliﬁed economy the strategic interaction between the two players manifests
itself in two ways: ﬁrst, the fact that risky behavior on the part of the bank increases the
potential for default, which is costly to society; second, a change in the monetary authority’s
instrument, r
f
t , aﬀects the bank’s appetite for risk. The incentive to search for yield is captured
by the diﬀerence between the diﬀerent return on the two asset classes: ra
t − r
f

















Equation (12) represents how the cycle aﬀects the yield on the risky asset (parameters κ0
and κ1 are positive constants). Equation (13) represents aggregate demand, (IS), which is
directly aﬀected by the monetary authority through r
f
t , but is also subject to the state of the
ﬁnancial sector captured by the expected cost of default, −γwα2
t.10 Here γw is the social cost
10We interpret it as an opportunity cost to government expenditure, which enters the aggregate constraint
13from the event of default, which occurs with probability α2
t. We thus assume, in reduced form,
that the probability of bank failure is α2
t. With this formulation we obtain that the bank will
optimally diversify its portfolio (i.e. 0 < αt < 1) without having to assume risk aversion. There
is also empirical evidence that bank default rates increase convexly in measures of risk taking,
such as loan-to-asset ratios (Estrella et al. (2000), Kocagil et al. (2002), Halling and Hayden
(2006)). In that sense, the quadratic form oﬀers an approximation to this empirical feature.
Note that the choice for this ad hoc function relating bank risk to default rates is driven by the
need to keep the model numerically soluble. Because of the asymmetric constraint αt ≥ βαt−1
the model cannot be solved with Bellman equations. Rather, numerical simulation requires
a grid search, which, in order to yield results, necessitates simplicity. We interpret γw as
the opportunity cost of government expenditure, since a government that commits funds to
a bailout, can devote less funds to other projects. Finally, both variables are aﬀected by the
common demand shock, εt, which is as described in the general-form model, (3).




















where αt ∈ [0,1]
αt ≥ βαt−1 ∀t ∈ [1,T].
When bank failure occurs, bank management experiences a loss worth γb. We allow this to
diﬀer from the loss experienced by society, γw(in 13). In particular, we assume that the failing
bank is always rescued and can continue to operate. Thus, γw is the cost of the bailout,
whereas γb can be seen as a reputational or agent-based cost (part of bank management
may be replaced, for instance). Furthermore, δ is the discount rate (assumed to be constant
and independent of r
f
t ). We thus focus only on the bank’s asset side, and leave its funding
unmodelled.
The monetary authority’s objective is as given by (15). However, αw
t = 0 as we abstract
from the social value of risk taking. In this example bank risk is only socially harmful as it






















The monetary authority has direct control over the risk-free rate, r
f
t . It uses this to both
target the output gap11 and to inﬂuence bank risk taking (i.e.: the bank’s incentive to search
with a negative sign.
11Note that (13) is a reduced form representation of the standard two equation model of inﬂation and output.
14for yield), subject to (12) and (13).
























where η ∈ (0,1) is the rate of decay of monetary policy,12 and ξ > 1. Moreover, ξ < κ0,
such that the return on the risky asset is always higher than that on the risk-free asset, in
equilibrium.




















where rf, α and ε are (T +1)×1 vectors with t = 0 values as ﬁrst entry and t = T as last; δ
is a (T + 1) × 1 vector with δ
0 as ﬁrst entry and δ
T as last; ξ is a (T + 1) × 1 vector with all
entries ξ; and η is the following (T + 1) × (T + 1) matrix:
η =

   

1 0 ... 0
η 1 ... 0
. . .
. . . ... . . .
ηT ηT−1 ... 1

   

.
We solve the optimization problems using numerical techniques. First, we write a proce-
dure to solve for bank optimization at given interest rates. This procedure is then nested in
the monetary authority’s optimization problem, which is solved through numerical gridpoint
search. The GAUSS code of this program is available upon request.
We choose parameter values judgementally. The purpose of the excercise is to visually
highlight some of the model’s comparative statics. We take the paramaterization for ﬁgure 8
as a "baseline".13 It replicates both the level eﬀect and the dynamic v-shape derived in the
general form. The solid line represents the case of ρ = 0, while the broken line is the optimal
policy of an authority that has a ﬁnancial stability objective (ρ = 0.5 here).
This is a simplifying assumptions that allows us to concentrate on the way ﬁnancial stability concerns enter
the model as well as the monetary authority’s objectives.
12This decay factor formulation is chosen for analytical tractability. Empirically, the eﬀect of monetary
policy does not linearly decrease over time. Christiano et al. (2005) estimate that output, consumption and
investment peak after about 1.5 years, and are back at initial levels after about 3 years, while inﬂation peaks
at about 2 years.
13Parameter values are β = 0.7, γw = 1, γb = 0.5, η = 0.6, ν = −0.1, θ = 0.7, δ = 0.95, λ0 = 1.15,
λ1 = 0.005, ξ = 0.05.
15Figure 8:Baseline scenario
With a higher persistence of the shock (θ = 0.9), the diﬀerence between the two policy
paths becomes larger:
Figure 9: Persistent demand shock.
When the transmission of monetary policy to the real economy becomes faster (smaller η,
here η = 0.5), the initial rate cut of the ρ > 0 authority becomes less pronounced. The reason
is that there is less possibility of intertemporal substition to satisfy both the targets of the
central bank:
16Figure 10: Quicker monetary policy transmission.
High patience increases the willingness of the policymaker to substitute intermporally,
which strengthens the dynamic eﬀects described in the general form (here, δ = 0.99):
Figure 11: Higher patience
When the risky assets become more liquid (here β = 0.6), the dynamic eﬀect becomes less
pronounced. It is the illiquidity of risky assets that drives the monetary authority’s decision
to keep the rate cut short, after all:
17Figure 12: More liquid assets
When the bank internalizes more of the social costs of its own default (here, γb = 0.9), the
policy paths of the ρ = 0 and ρ > 0 authorities become more similar:
Figure 13. Bank internalizes social costs.
A positive shock (ν = +0.1) inverts the story. The ρ = 0 authority now chooses a shorter
deeper rate hike than the ρ > 0 authority.
18Figure 14: Positive shocks
4 Conclusions
In an eﬀort to account for the role of monetary policy in ﬁnancial markets’ appetite for risk, we
model the interaction between a monetary authority and a commercial bank. We thus allow
for the bank’s action to be aﬀected by the business cycle and, by consequence, the policy
maker’s decisions. Similarly, the bank’s level of risk taking aﬀects the ability of the monetary
authority (and society) to achieve the desired level of output stabilization. We argue that
a monetary authority that actively accounts for the level of risk that banks take will adjust
their instrument in two important ways: ﬁrst, the interest rate will be higher on average, and
second, following a negative shock, the monetary authority will cut interest rates deeper but
will revert faster to the steady state. The latter is necessary in order to discourage banks from
taking risk, as risk taking increases when interest rates remain low for long periods.
19APPENDIX
A Nash vs. Stackelberg
Figure A.1 plots the two players reaction functions as well as their welfare (losses and proﬁts























In the Stackelberg game, the monetary authority, which acts as the leader, moves along
the bank’s reaction function in the direction that brings the outcome at a lower loss and closer
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Figure 8: Figure A.1 Welfare functions
The Stackelberg solution allows for the monetary authority to endogenize the bank risk
20taking and therefore aﬀect it in a way that is credible. This leads to a steady state outcome
that corresponds to a higher interest rate and lower risk level, by comparison to Nash.
B Commitment
We have assumed that the monetary authority fully commits to the interest rate path.
Proposition 3 If ρ > 0, such a commitment is time-consistent and therefore fully credible.
Proof. The result of relevance is the dynamic eﬀect in proposition 1. It is here that, in
response to a shock, the authority announces a path from which it could potentially deviate
later. Allowing for deviations from the pre-announced path, we let the bank play a tit-for-tat
strategy: if the monetary authority ever deviates from the path that it has announced, the
bank resorts to risk-taking against the λ = 0 path. Note that the λ = 0 path is fully credible as
it is the monetary authority’s optimal path that minimizes the stabilization objective, [yt ( )]
2.
No monetary authority would wish to deviate to a λ < 0 as it would unambiguously loose
out on both objectives in L. The potential beneﬁt of deviating from an announced λ > 0
path is gaining on [yt ( )]
2. If, at the same time, risk behavior remains in accordance with
the λ > 0 path, then the monetary authority sees a clear reduction (improvement) in its
losses. We argue however, that this is not possible, as risk behavior will adjust immediately
upon observing such deviation. Following the notation of the proof of Proposition 1, split
the interest rate path into r
f
t for t <   t and t >   t. For t >   t we have that αt|λ>0 < αt|λ=0.
But, the dynamic constraint on risk taking, αt ≥ βαt−1 is only binding downwards. By the
bank’s tit-for-tat strategy, then, if the monetary authority deviates from its path at any t >   t,
it loses out unambiguously: the bank can directly adjust risk taking to the λ = 0 path. For
t <   t deviation would imply the exact same outcome for the path of αt as just announcing
λ = 0. The bank follows the same path of αt for t <   t under λ = 0 and λ > 0, after all (as
depicted in ﬁgure 5). But in terms of its [yt ( )]
2 ﬁrst announcing λ > 0 and later following
λ = 0 cannot be an improvement either, by the fact that λ = 0 minimizes [yt ( )]
2. Hence,
given this reaction from the part of the bank, the monetary authority gains nothing on either
of its objectives by deviating from its pre-announced path.
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